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Abstract: In this paper, I discuss the status of critical theory and thinking, 
claiming that we should not throw the baby out with the bathwater: if a certain 
way of conceiving and practicing it has nowadays become partial and unfit, then 
it’s not true that it is qua tale useless, old-fashioned, or dead. I start stressing 
that, in general, Critical Theory highlights that there is a problematic relation 
between individuals and social structure, which has to be pointed out, to indicate 
actual and possible transformations. Then, I propose a heuristic distinction 
between two main paradigms of Critical Theory and thinking (the modern 
Critical Theory and the postmodern Critical Theory), discussing three main 
aspects, separated but intertwined. The first is more strictly philosophical, 
involving the problem of the transcendent or immanent position of the critique: 
on the one hand, we have the external condemnation of the society, in the name 
of some kind of superior truth; on the other hand, we have the inner 
problematization of a given social field, according to criteria that have been 
posited by itself or that are implicit in it (§ 1). The second is more strictly 
anthropological, dealing with the problem of human nature and alienation: on 
the one hand, we have the hope for the restoration of a lost state of originary 
plenitude; on the other hand, we have the effort of learning the better way to 
deal with human openness and relationality (§ 2). The third is more strictly 
sociological, posing the question of ways and forms of life: on the one hand, we 
have an ironical attitude, aiming to elaborate a true counter-society that should 
take the place of the false present one; on the other hand, we have a humoristic 
attitude, that attempts to make the problem that a society both poses and tries to 
answer a problem that reemerges, so that it can be again for the first time seen 
as a problem (§ 3). 
 
Keywords: : Postmodernism, Philosophical Anthropology, Immanent Critique, 
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What I want to teach is: to pass from unobvious nonsense to obvious nonsense. 
(L. Wittgenstein). 
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Critical Theory is Said in 
Many Ways 
 
Talking about critical theory and 
thinking (CTT), we refer to the ge-
neral idea that philosophy is linked 
with a critical attitude towards 
society: it can, should, or either must 
develop a critique of society, in 
order to make it better, or – at least – 
make people perceive the necessity 
of its transformation and impro-
vement. CTT provides a sort of 
normative description: it says that 
something doesn’t work in the 
society, and that full human eman-
cipation is to be reached. 
In a stricter sense, the specific 
difference of a CTT may depend on 
its conception of the core of society 
– i.e. institutional, linguistic, econo-
mic, repressive, globalized, commu-
nicational, ideological, affective, 
imaginary –, or on its key-disci-
plines – i.e. Frankfurt School, with 
philosophy, psychoanalysis, Mar-
xism; Structuralism, with anthro-
pology, semiology, linguistics; Post-
structuralism, with cultural, gender 
and media studies; Globalization 
Theories, with geopolitics, econo-
mics, bio-sciences.1 
But, Plato and Hegel would say, 
we should not miss the forest for the 
trees: CTT highlights anyway that 
there is a problematic relation between 
individuals and social structure, 
which has to be pointed out, to indi-
cate actual and possible transfor-
mations. 
I propose here a general heuristic 
distinction between two main 
paradigms of CTT: the modern one 
(mCTT) and the postmodern one 
(pmCTT).2 Such a contraposition 
may seem too “Manichaean” or even 
“strawy”, but it can both show some 
important limits of mCTT and 
explain how pmCTT represents a 
development of its instances. 
The Modernism-Postmodernism 
debate is still lively, but here I 
intend to stress two basic aspects. 
Firstly, the modern conviction that 
the (only one) truth does or could 
exist is substituted by the postmo-
dern (dis)belief that such a “one and 
only” truth does not and could not 
exist (the problem of “the end of the 
grand narratives”). Secondly, this 
shift has important consequences on 
how CTT is, and not just in the 
sense that – as for instance Jameson 
notoriously suggests – Postmoder-
nism is the cultural logic of late 
capitalism, something that closes the 
possibility of any kind of criticism 
(the problem of the “unfinished 
project of emancipation”). 
Here, I take as both a state of 
case (quid facti) and something to 
enquire into (quid juri) the fact that 
the tasks of intellectuals change 
from being legislators to being 
interpreters along with the transition 
from modernity to post-modernity:3 
intellectuals can no more “educate” 
and “cure” but can still “compre-
hend” and “throw into crisis”. As 
Spinoza docet, «not to deride, 
bewail, or execrate human actions, 
but to understand them»:4 that’s the 
Northern Star of the critical attitude. 
Interpreting, or understanding, does 
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not mean – as I will explain – to be 
simply “indifferent” or “descrip-
tive”; rather, it means being careful 
to the specific difference you are 
facing, by problematizing it. 
Hence, my key claim can be 
resumed with the saying we should 
not throw the baby out with the 
bathwater. If a certain way of con-
ceiving and practicing CTT has 
nowadays become partial and unfit 
and we have to “update” CTT’s key-
authors (going beyond the “classi-
cal” Adorno, Arendt, Benjamin, 
Habermas, Horkheimer, Marcuse, 
etc.), then it’s not true that CTT qua 
tale is useless, old-fashioned, or 
dead. 
I will discuss three main aspects, 
separated but intertwined: one that is 
more strictly philosophical, invol-
ving the problem of the transcendent 
or immanent position of the critique 
(§ 1); one more strictly anthropo-
logical, dealing with the problem of 
human nature and alienation (§ 2); 
one more strictly sociological, 
posing the question of ways and 
forms of life (§ 3). 
I will not do so much use of 
direct quotations, hoping to help in 
circumscribing better the conceptual 
issue at stake; nevertheless, I start by 
declaring two main kinds of general 
references as the background of my 
exposition. Concerning the postmo-
dern thought’s side, I will refer 
mostly to the conceptual framework 
offered by French authors like 
Deleuze, Derrida, and Lyotard.5 
Concerning the critical reflection’s 
side, I will take into account, above 
all, some important recent 
developments of the CTT’s 
perspective,6 but also some moments 
of the Marxian tradition.7 
 
Where to Stand? 
Transcendent and 
Immanent Position 
 
Escape-strategy 
 
In mCTT, criticizing, transcen-
ding, and opposing are all in one: 
you need to separate from the social 
reality in order to negate its co-
gency. Transcendence means not 
simply disengagement (staying 
nowhere), but opposition (staying 
somewhere else and thus against 
“this where”): society has to be 
faced frontally and attacked, critici-
zing is striking the present and the 
existent, refusing to coincide with it 
and making efforts to transform it. 
But when you say that something 
doesn’t work, you also need to 
explain what (and why) could or 
should actually work instead. Any 
transcendence presupposes an exter-
nal position to make the judgement 
possible, a place which is not merely 
different from the one you are 
blaming or disputing, but more 
radically better than it. There is, 
somewhere, something that makes 
the (suppression of the) contra-
diction between this poor and inade-
quate reality and another better and 
adequate possible reality. 
This place could be metaphysical 
or physical (or both of them, or one 
could ground the other and vice 
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versa), but there must be, in order to 
distance from the reality and negate 
it. Exteriority entails superiority: the 
other place is a higher one, it’s the 
“normative prop” for the critique. In 
addition, there is someone who is 
able to gain knowledge on how to 
live properly, on the best world and 
behaviors: one who can know what 
people want or should want better 
than themselves. 
But, this is where mCTT came 
to,8 such a real “above place” cannot 
exist. Conceptually, you cannot refer 
to a universal Truth, an encom-
passing Concept, an incontrovertible 
Norm, or an exclusive Ought-Being 
(no more Capitals are given). 
Historically, after the unmasking of 
Real Socialism and the fall of the 
USSR, you cannot rely anymore on 
the concrete existence of another 
better world (no more “Priests of 
the Truth” are given). Finally, we 
shouldn’t renounce to the passion 
for another better world, but it 
becomes the afflatus towards a uto-
pia, the nostalgia for a completely 
other, or the disillusion with any 
kind of positivity. 
If you start with the idea that a 
false condition must be substituted 
with the true condition, but finally 
you realize that this true condition 
does not or cannot exist anymore, 
then you can – at the best – claim 
that the fight against the false 
condition never ends, no matter if 
we don’t know where it will lead. 
You aspire to be a partisan, but 
you find yourself without no more 
“part(y)”; you aspire to criticize any 
kind of onesideness, but you find 
asking yourself if there could be any 
right side; you argue that one could 
criticize the system only standing 
outside it, but you find yourself with 
no more outside: critique becomes 
the generic refusal of the constitu-
tively imperfect reality, or – even 
worse – critique is erased. Interested 
in blaming contradictions, you risk 
to get stuck in the contradictions 
produced by your own blaming. 
 
Fold-strategy 
 
So, pmCTT is an attempt to take 
charge of such a criticality, in order 
to save both the mCTT’s inspiration 
and try to resolve its ambiguities.9 In 
a general sense, while mCTT is 
more focused in “criticizing”, 
pmCTT pays more attention to 
“critiquing”: the first encompasses a 
negative and destructive gesture, 
that aims at finding fault with some-
thing, to discover and condemn 
lacks and defects; the second exhi-
bits a positive and reconstructive 
gesture, that aims at looking at the 
structure of something in order to 
ask for clarification, and to find 
what and how is working and not 
working. Criticizing wants to judge. 
Critiquing wants to discuss. 
Thus, in pmCTT critiquing is 
standing inside and raise problems: 
going deep into the social reality in 
order to individuate its own “critical 
points”, its inner fractures and zones 
of tension. Here, immanence means 
not indifference or concurrence, but 
problematization: society is queried, 
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critiquing is questioning the intimate 
structure of the present and the 
existent, asking for its conditions 
and presuppositions, reconstructing 
its dynamics and possibilities of 
mutation. 
In doing so, you cannot be 
outside and over the society: you are 
in it and you have actually no other 
society; you cannot judge in the 
name of another (real or imaged) 
better place. Nevertheless, you can 
evaluate: you should dive and see 
how the waters go, where the 
currents lead, and what kind of 
inherent crack you can testify. You 
cannot judge in the name of The 
Good and The Evil, but you can 
continue to evaluate what is good 
and bad each time: having no 
“transcendent prop” opens the space 
for the immanent comprehension 
and interrogation. 
Questioning, as emblem of the 
problematization, is what pmCTT’s 
does: interrogating, not affirming, 
neither negating. To pose a question 
(to problematize) is to see the ele-
ments of a situation as challenges, as 
something that invite who is invol-
ved into the situation to transform it. 
When you raise a problem, you 
don’t know the answer, you are not 
supposed to know it at any cost: it’s 
firstly a matter of defamiliarization 
and demythicisation, leading to a 
draw back from what is taken for 
granted and to reevaluate it. 
Before choosing the right answer, 
to pose a question provides the visi-
bility of different possible answers; 
before the enlightening of the truth, 
to present a problem marks the en-
trance in that zone of indiscerna-
bility that soften the edges of what is 
taken for true. A question operates 
as an inner factor of folding inside a 
system or a situation: it opens the 
initial phase of a work of re-
enquiring and of a possible process 
of transformation, but it cannot 
predict its final destination or point 
at its inner goal. 
A question is not a mere cu-
riosity: it’s rather a demand, the 
expression of an impelling force, 
that allows a difference to emerge 
(from renewed consciousness to new 
actions). Thus, an evaluation is here 
at stake: asking for something in a 
problematic way means bringing out 
something like an inner “misma-
tching” of a given field, something 
whose value is now put under 
investigation. 
Therefore, for pmCTT, if we 
want to claim the need for some 
standard in the critical work, we 
should keep in mind that the stan-
dards employed cannot but derive 
from the critiqued itself, namely, the 
society in question, and not from 
somewhere else. Critiquing doesn’t 
mean saying and giving an account 
of what is the (individual or social) 
right thing to do; neither allowing to 
derive what is to be done for all 
possible situations: instead, it means 
showing the inner potential of modi-
fication within a given situation. 
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Close Encounters of the 
Third Kind: We Are 
(Between) Aliens 
 
For pmCTT, alienation, far from 
representing – as it’s in mCTT – a 
perversion of human essence and 
nature, should rather be conceived 
as a revelation of it: the human 
being is constitutively alien to 
himself (zoon allotriomenon).10 But 
all alienations aren’t the same, they 
don’t go in the same way: the human 
being’s in-itself is actually a for-
itself, but not all the ways of “being 
out” are equal (I will discuss this 
further on). 
Following the German Idealism’s 
tradition, alienation could be distin-
guished in such terms as objecti-
fication, extrinsecation, reification, 
estrangement, externalization; ne-
vertheless, here it’s sufficient to 
highlight two big main senses of 
alienation, one proper of mCTT and 
the other of pmCTT: the romantic 
perspective [RP] and the cynic 
perspective [CP]. 
I know, such a distinction 
appears to encapsulate what postmo-
dern thought claims to have laid to 
rest, that is, the characterization of 
the term “alienation” suggested in 
RP is provided by CP itself. Truly, 
it’s through the second that the first 
notion of alienation appears to de-
pend on concepts like “presence”, 
“proper”, along with the semantic of 
“essence” and “origin”, which is 
purported to underpin them: it’s only 
in the impetus of the unmasking and 
debunking of any notion of an 
unalienated condition that such a lo-
gic of the origins can be revealed.11 
But here I don’t consider so 
important if RP is really the one and 
only anthropological heart of mCTT, 
or if it completely exhausts how 
alienation is (explicitly or implicitly) 
meant in mCTT: I intend to 
distinguish sharply RP and CP as 
possible paradigms, as to show the 
intimate relation between CP and 
pmCTT. 
 
Lost Paradise 
 
For RP, alienation is the name of 
a teleological and eschatological 
grand narrative of fall and redemp-
tion, of the loss and hope for the 
restoration of a state of originary 
plenitude, a state of fullness. Here, 
we have the loss of something 
original and essential that could or 
should be regained in the future, 
entailing the belief in a lost and 
retrievable human essence – the 
authentic human nature: we refer to 
the simple unity of an originary 
human essence; a lost unity, that can 
be regained exactly because pre-
viously lost. 
Alienation has to be overcome or 
suppressed: human history is the 
effort to restore origins, return to 
authentic life, repair corruption. 
Reestablish, reintegrate, reconci-
liate: if you exit and move away 
from an essential and predefined 
core, you have to go back to it and 
come back in it. 
Then, for RP the truth, or the real 
content, lies in the origin: the true 
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human essence is “saved” or 
“enshrined” in the origin, which has 
to be revealed if not yet shown (as 
in any teleological view), or reco-
vered if lost (as in the original sin 
affair). “Exteriority” is nothing but a 
manifestation of the “interiority” 
that keeps the real core: the first 
risks – at the best – to distort the 
second, and fail in fully restoring it; 
but – in the end – exteriority is 
always totally inadequate regarding 
the pristine origin or essential 
nucleus. 
Thus, for RP a society is judged 
wrong or unjust by comparing it to 
an essential human nature and its 
own features (rationality, morality, 
goodness, equality, harmony, and so 
on, or their opposite): a society must 
correspond to this essence and re-
flect its characteristics, or – at least 
– it must realize its fundamental 
traits in the most possible adequate 
way – and this is always a lack if 
compared to the perfection of the 
original core. 
It’s just like the projective mo-
vement of birth would have broken 
the comfort of womb’s life, 
conceived as the real life that should 
be desperately reconquered. 
 
Purgatorial Life 
 
For CP, in its turn, alienation 
reveals and expresses human nature; 
it doesn’t deform, pervert, corrupt, 
restore, recover, etc. it in its own 
essential features: human nature is at 
all effects entailed in a process of 
mediation, that is, in a work of 
“passing through” otherness and 
alterity (from things to other ani-
mals, from social organizations to 
symbols, and so forth). 
Thus, human being has not a 
unique specific determination, a pre-
established set of qualities: there 
isn’t a substantial identity to be 
recovered or reflected, neither a bare 
abstract infinite determinability, 
independent from any determina-
tion. In fact, a process of mediation 
entails actually the immersion in a 
web of determinations, which are 
not the ultimate and definitive ones, 
which can be good and bad, and 
which offer some opportunities and 
keep some others closed – or unper-
ceived. That’s where the critical 
attitude makes its own specificity 
works (I will return on this). 
For CP, different modes and 
means of production, ways of social 
life, political structures, technolo-
gies, etc. represent the way human 
beings shape their life and express 
their needs: every different mode 
works in such a shaping and ex-
pression, and it’s exactly this 
difference that makes them not 
equivalent. They all satisfy but not 
in the same way, they are all ex-
pressive but not in the same way. 
How a mode should work is not pre-
determined in advance and cannot 
be judged in the name of “the true 
human essence”. 
So, for CP, to reflect critically on 
the society and its conditions, you 
have to avoid at least two mood-
traps: nostalgia/phobia, and hubris/-
mania.12 
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The first is the trap of some pri-
mordial authenticity, pristine nature, 
or – in general – virgin phenomena: 
the beginning is the promised land, 
lost because of corruption, and 
hence it’s progressively reclaimable 
only through the embankment or the 
containment (katechon) of the 
present situation. But this is just like 
saying that the plane could fly faster 
if there was no air. 
The second is the trap of ultimate 
power, extreme self-confidence, or – 
in general – blind euphoria: we can 
in no way improve the present, or – 
even worse – improve it only going 
ahead in the same direction walked 
until now. But this is just like 
believing that the plane itself creates 
the air thanks to it and in which it 
flies. 
Actually, both moods testifies a 
lack of sober reflective discernment, 
undermining the in-between of 
them: the locus of mediation, as of – 
literally – critique. 
This sobriety is more accepted 
concerning the human being/techno-
logy relationship (technique does 
not pervert but do show and build 
humanity), but less in the 
relationship of human being with 
society, history, institutions, and 
modes of social production. In these 
cases, mediation appears to operate 
as a repressive or distorting factor, 
rather than an expressive or possi-
bilitating one. 
But if – for instance – we take 
seriously the fact that we are hu-
mans because we want to live in a 
happy society and not because we 
should correspond to some image of 
the ideal human being, we have to 
admit to all effects the plurality of 
ways of being and living. So, we 
have also to acknowledge that (free) 
market is not the devil, but a set of 
social practices through which it can 
be managed in various ways acti-
vities as property, production, labor, 
exchange, etc., and even a possible 
relational vector of emancipation – 
namely, that it’s still possible to 
distinguish between “market econo-
my” or “market societies” and “capi-
talism”.13 
More in general, in CP’s per-
spective, we thematise not just what 
prevents us from living according to 
the Good, but better what prevents 
us from asking ourselves how we 
want to live and how we are living 
at the moment. What is in question 
is not so much the what we are 
trying to reach in and through the 
process, but mostly the how of its 
course: if our attempt to appropriate 
(to comprehend, reconstruct, be all 
in one, make consistent, give account 
for, feel happiness and satisfaction 
for, etc.) our life is damaged or 
prevented, we are living a bad life. 
A society is good as long as it opens 
such a possibility to its members, 
namely, as it offers effective possi-
bilities and not just abstract or 
hypothetical ones. It’s not a matter 
of being part of a teleological 
process or of being protagonist of a 
recover of an essence already and, 
since the beginning, proper and 
determined: it’s a question of being 
in the middle of a process, whose 
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proceeding and experiencing should 
not be arrested or paralyzed. Appro-
priate doesn’t mean reappropriate. 
Provokingly, a society is good as 
long as it allows alienation, for the 
alienation process doesn’t ground 
itself in advance but only in its 
during: one cannot refer to some-
thing that one already is or was, but 
nevertheless endeavors to come and 
relate to oneself. 
For CP, finally, something like a 
“not alienated life” could be nothing 
but the ability to pose problems, 
develop them, and react to them 
when they engender obstacles – 
whether this reaction culminate in a 
violent conflict, or in a peaceful 
discussion, cannot be determined in 
advance. Without exteriorization 
there cannot be nothing to “hack”: 
alienation cannot be extinguished, 
it’s a matter of learning the better 
way to deal with it, and of building a 
society that makes this possible. 
 
Attitudes Have 
Consequences 
 
Taking into account all this, we 
can come closer to the relationship 
between CTT and society, asking: 
1. What kind of attitudes 
towards social life could be 
considered typical of mCTT and 
pmCTT? 
2. Then, what kind of social 
function can be carried out by the 
critical work? 
 
Sense the Non-Sense 
 
I suggest to distinguish two main 
attitudes, typical of mCTT and 
pmCTT respectively: irony and 
humor. The biggest differences can 
be summed as follows:
 
Irony Humor 
Judges. Reverses. 
Marks the distance of who has another 
place. 
Indicates the involvement of who is 
questioning his own place. 
Is the art of ascent at the height. Is the art of descent towards the 
circumstances. 
Has a well-established plan. Has not an established project or system 
of reference. 
Pretends to be its own contrary to lead to 
the truth and aimed goal in a safer way. 
Has no sovereignty or original meaning 
to reestablish. 
Is an edifying, pedantic, and pedagogical 
cunning. 
Is a deviating, confusing, and deviant 
movement. 
Derides, ridicules, and confutes 
ignorance and madness. 
Plays from the within stupidity and folly. 
Goes in search for the truth, the 
unmasking of what really lies 
underneath, the announcement of the 
right principle. 
Asks where something can lead, which 
its prolongations could be, how it could 
be. 
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Irony Humor 
Defends a thesis from the beginning. Engenders puzzlement first of all. 
Wants to substitute a sense (the wrong 
one) with another sense (the right one). 
Works on and with non-sense in order to 
open a crack within the sense. 
Wants to discover, recognize and behold 
ideals. 
Raises, poses and develops problems. 
 
Whereas the ironist mocks in a 
sarcastic way the contradictions of a 
system in the name of what is 
“extra” or “outside” it, the humorist 
plays with-in a system provoking the 
manifestation of its own internal 
tensions. To problematize means 
actually producing literal confusion, 
suspension, virtualization, and so on 
– folding: a problem engenders a 
doubt, conceived as that inner dou-
bling, the marks a split, an opening, 
an intimate ouverture within a 
system. 
As it has been stressed, «whereas 
the ethics» – as attitude or posture – 
«of irony posits ideas and concepts 
towards which we ought to strive, or 
what we must mean when we use 
words like “justice”, humor allows 
all the repressed and meaningless 
drives of the body to disrupt 
sense».14 Disrupting is to all effects 
interrupting a process, by causing a 
disturbance and making it emerge: 
it’s making a system produces an 
internal resonance. Humor triggers a 
wrong-foot effect – quite close, so to 
say, to the Brechtian 
Verfremdungseffekt. 
The history of the relationship 
between irony and philosophy is as 
old as philosophy itself, and quite a 
lot of things have been written about 
it. Clearly, I cannot fully discuss it 
here, but I want nevertheless to 
prevent a possible objection: there’s 
nothing new in saying that philoso-
phy has a critical attitude in a 
humoristic way; actually, traditional 
“irony” seems to coincides with 
what is here called “humor”. 
This objection entails very im-
portant issues: the essence of philo-
sophy, the tension between the 
Socrates’ and Plato’s view of philo-
sophy, etc. For instance, one could 
answer by saying that whereas Plato 
was ironical, Socrates was humo-
ristic, or even that the foundation of 
philosophy in a strict sense consists 
in the transformation of the Socratic 
humor in a more consistent and 
grounded irony – before Aristotle 
came to say that such attitudes 
should be substituted with a sharper 
scientific detachment, and all its 
implications (i.e. thauma is no more 
just “perplexity”, neither “indigna-
tion”, but becomes “amazement”). 
Besides, to explain how humor is 
different from traditional philoso-
phical irony, I prefer to evoke – 
once again – another important 
philosophical figure: cynics. In the 
common sense, a cynic is a con-
temptuous person coveting for 
success and richness, or at least not 
caring about others: the emblem of a 
ruthless, pitiless, and cold person. 
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So, cynicism is the perfect example 
of an apolitical and non-empathic 
attitude towards society and others, 
to the point that «cynicism will 
never become an active measure; it 
will simply accept the order of 
things».15 But if we pay more 
attention, we can see the other side 
of the coin.16  
A cynic attitude is in fact a 
humoristic attitude full of political 
meaning, and – more precisely – 
exactly owing to its capacity of 
folding. 
Let’s take one of the most famous 
cynic: Diogenes of Sinope. As the 
story tells, he slept in a large cera-
mic jar in the marketplace, carried a 
lamp in the daytime claiming to be 
looking for an honest man, publicly 
kidded Alexander the Great, distrac-
ted attendees by bringing food and 
eating during the discussions in 
philosophical lectures, etc. In such 
cases, he was to all effects playing a 
socio-critical role, by striving to 
make perceivable the zone of 
distinction and transition between 
physis and nomos. Moreover, he was 
doing this by assuming a clearly 
provoking, fun and weird 
(humoristic) attitude. 
This is pretty well known, but it 
has to be understood more into 
depth. In fact, this kind of “embo-
died questioning” of the tension 
between nature-immediate and 
culture-mediate is the performing of 
an act of problematization, namely, 
of a practice of critique in the literal 
sense: an attempt to exhibit and 
engender together their inner ridge 
and crack. On the one hand, the 
supposed physis of the naturalness 
of the social conduct is suspended 
and shown to be actually in the field 
of the nomos; on the other hand, the 
supposed physis of the naturalness 
of the life outside any kind of social 
influence or determination is 
baffled, to the extent that it appears 
totally weird, and as a different form 
of (provoking, shocking, individual, 
etc.) nomos. 
So, even more deeply, a cynic is 
properly an example of that process 
of folding, through which a re-fold, 
namely, something like an intimate 
reverberation, can happen within a 
field, a system, or a situation. Cyni-
cism is here a vector of problema-
tization: a vehicle of the immanent 
critique. A cynic doesn’t simply 
show the “bare truth” (this is life, 
can’t help it!); rather, a cynic bares 
the truth, which is not to say that 
erases any kind of truth. On the 
contrary, the cynic attitude exposes 
the condition of possibility, founda-
tions and development of the truth, 
of any truth in general, and mostly 
of the specific truth one is facing or 
is involved in. Such an exposure, 
finally, is exactly the humoristic 
exhibition-creation of a paradox. 
Humor works on and with non-
sense (sense is both how things are 
“sensed” and where things goes): it 
engenders paradoxes. Our daily 
experience teaches this (just think of 
humoristic comedians). A paradox is 
not the simply contradiction of the 
doxa (a counter-dox, so to say); 
instead, it’s the genesis of the shift 
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of the doxa. A paradox marks the 
increasing of doubt and the de-
creasing of confidence about some-
thing, not the mere affirmation of its 
contrary, neither of something 
different: it fends off security and 
increase perplexity within a 
structure. 
Moreover, in doing so the para-
dox shows the source of the doxa 
qua tale: it forces a system both to 
show its own instability and to make 
its own virtual potential raise; and 
it’s exactly this “tensor” that testifies 
of the fount of systematicity in itself. 
A paradox doesn’t ironically pro-
vide a counter-sense, or presuppose 
an alter-sense; neither it’s barely 
senseless: by exposing the inner 
non-sense within and of a given 
sense, it exhibits the non-sense as 
the spring of that specific sense and 
of sense itself – or, put in other 
words, it manifests the act of 
donation of sense qua tale (as the 
Derridian hyperbole, maybe). 
The theater artist Carmelo Bene 
often told of Lèon Bloy’s definition 
of paradox: “a telescope for the stars 
and a microscope for the minimum 
bodies”. This affirmation, albeit 
rhetorical, spots very well the speci-
ficity of paradox: it makes visible 
something that we are somehow 
already seeing or experiencing, or – 
even better – something that consti-
tutes the condition, the framework, 
or the structure of our seeing and 
experiencing. 
Lastly, the form of paradox for 
excellence is the question, the pro-
blem as questioning, and – at the 
same time – the form of questioning 
and problematizing for excellence is 
the paradox. The connection between 
paradox, question and problem is 
often technically stressed and deba-
ted,17 but here I just want to 
underline that as the question tells us 
about the “looping effect” engen-
dered by the paradox, the paradox 
tells us about the “puzzlingness” 
proper of a question which is not 
merely the search for an informa-
tion, a data, a state of case, a fact, 
etc. Briefly, a paradox-problem-
question makes visible something 
undecidable, intractable and re-
sistant: in this way, it determines a 
change of the intensity within a 
system, that is, the demand for its 
rediscussion or transformation.18  
As it should be clear, this is not a 
pure logical fact or only an abstract 
issue: the social role played by the 
critique it’s here at stake. Thus, two 
different socio-critical roles and 
behaviors may correspond to the two 
attitudes presented above. 
 
Reconstruct How, not Prescribe 
What 
 
Shortly, mCTT aims at trans-
forming the present society in a 
correct society, it’s motivated by a 
practical interest in emancipation, 
it’s engaged in the struggle for the 
future: the society is a sick patient 
that needs an urgent cure. In its turn, 
pmCTT tries to enlighten the con-
ditions of possibility, formation, and 
genesis of the society, or – more 
precisely –the relationship between 
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the individual and society, because 
the second affects and constitutes 
the first, while the first reproduces 
and nourishes the second. 
Hence, pmCTT doesn’t lose 
potential of effective transformation, 
because its critique comes to put in 
crisis or in strain actions whose 
effects are in no way neutral or 
weak. Shortly, pmCTT problema-
tizes the society: it both gathers and 
builds its inner paradoxes. 
Using medical terms, critical 
work provides a sort of sympto-
matology for pmCTT: it dissociates 
symptoms that were previously 
grouped together and juxtaposes 
them with others that were pre-
viously dissociated, creating one 
concept that becomes the name of a 
syndrome, which marks the meeting 
place, point of coincidence or 
convergence of the signs and 
components of the problem, namely 
the symptoms. This is not the same 
task of etiology, the search for 
causes, or of therapy, the develop-
ment and application of a treatment; 
it’s rather what underpins them, 
what makes the search for causes 
and solutions possible. Besides, this 
task cannot rely on a pre-given 
model of illness with which the 
situation should be compared: the 
pathology’s symptoms and syn-
drome are to be sought and found 
within the situation itself. That is to 
say: it’s not the pathological defor-
mation of a(n ideal or real) state of 
sanity, but it’s a pathology proper of 
the present state itself – its own 
crisis, exactly. 
For instance, it’s exactly in a 
society supposed to work for gua-
ranteeing or producing freedom that 
can acquire meaning and visibility 
questions as: are we really free then? 
What is freedom for us? How can I 
deal with a society that seems to ask 
me to relate with myself and others 
as a free being? Can we appropriate 
of our freedom only in an economic 
way? Etc. The work of immanent 
critique is to make such problems 
fully raising. 
Moreover, this is not a matter of 
contradictions, but of demands: 
when we ask ourselves if we are 
really free, we are not simply 
marking a contradiction between a 
promise and its realization; rather 
we are making a problem that asks 
for solutions to emerge. As men-
tioned, this is one of the deepest 
concept proper of pmCTT’s concep-
tuality: a “mismatching” is not a 
contradiction, it’s an internal diffe-
rence, a potential for transformation. 
Under this regard, pmCTT can 
provide not a functional or a moral 
analysis and society critique, but 
rather an ethical one, namely, it 
points not simply at the mecha-
nisms, dynamics, and performances 
of its own functioning, neither at its 
correspondence with some standard 
of justice, goodness, humanity, etc. 
Instead, it looks at the way and form 
of life that the society entails, fo-
cusing on how relations with 
oneself, others, and the world are 
experienced or could be experienced 
inside of it, as well as on the con-
ditions of possibility and formation 
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of such relations, and the grade of 
facility of the work of social self-
reflection itself – that is, the measure 
in which the society is able to put 
itself in question. 
Otherwise said, pmCTT starts 
from the idea that people are not 
always deliberately engaged in or 
explicitly reflecting upon what they 
are living: they might participate in 
their own forms of life without 
planning, intending, or even knowing 
exactly what they are doing and why 
they are doing it. What makes us act 
is not by itself actively acted, even 
when it’s actually acted. A way of 
life sets limits to what we can do as 
well as enables us to do things in a 
certain way: it’s given as well as 
created, but it might also develop a 
certain dynamic of its own. 
Nevertheless, it’s something that 
human beings do, and therefore 
could do otherwise. 
That’s where critique plays its 
role: as soon as a form of life hits its 
limits, things no longer run smo-
othly and are interrupted, so that this 
criticality doesn’t go unnoticed 
anymore. The moment of crisis 
forces reflection on and adjustments 
of practices that were previously 
taken for granted – their re-creation: 
the task of critique is actually to 
make this criticality notable and 
remarkable, by at the same time 
shaping and marking it. 
Hence, to be critical requires not 
to be the partisan or defender of a 
specific position, neither the herald 
of a renewed political-cultural and 
socio-economical manifest, but the 
effort to render the field of visibility 
visible, to make what makes possi-
ble specific social concepts concei-
vable. So, the fundamental task of 
pmCTT is not to simply elaborate a 
true counter-society that should take 
the place of the false present one, in 
the name of some kind of superior 
truth, but to reconstruct how this 
society has come to its own configu-
ration, how it works, and what it 
presupposes. 
Besides, pmCTT attempts to 
make the problem of a society 
emerge, a problem that the society 
both poses and tries to answer; thus 
pmCTT attempts to make such a 
problem reemerge, so that it can be 
again for the first time seen as a 
problem – the goal, let me say, is not 
to correct, but to show what does 
“rect”, namely, what holds and 
sustains a society. To make visible 
the invisible, perceivable the unper-
ceivable, conceivable the unconcei-
vable, thinkable the unthinkable, 
imaginable the unimaginable, and so 
forth, means not merely to render 
visible, perceivable, conceivable, 
etc. another thing, another possi-
bility, and so on, in addition to the 
ones already done. More deeply, it 
means to bring to the surface what 
makes those specific regimes of visi-
bility, perceptibility, etc. possible. 
As seen, this is the specificity of 
the immanent critique: evaluating 
the forms of life in question 
according to criteria that have been 
posited by themselves or that are 
implicit in them, namely, insisting 
exactly on the problematic link 
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between explicit and implicit levels 
– on the inner fold of a form of life. 
In this sense, we could say that 
pmCTT points at the social uncon-
scious of a society, where “unconsci-
ous” should mean a virtuality: a 
potential that animated and still ani-
mates, a further demand for integra-
tion, rather than something that 
should be finally unmasked in order 
to be removed and suppressed. Re-
construct means here to not simply 
demystify a failure and invoke the 
(past or future) Golden Age, but to 
understand a process and a dynamic, 
so that the signs of a future to 
construct become graspable, and the 
question about if and how indi-
viduals are able to relate to them-
selves and the process becomes 
posable. To thematise a crisis is both 
to show something that was already 
there, and to force to take into 
account something that now 
becomes “already there”, and thus is 
actively produced: then, you have to 
ask yourself how to deal with it, 
how to tackle it, etc. 
It’s the double meaning proper of 
every “invention”: together to find 
and to create. Thus, critique is a 
laborious creative practice, and this 
does not implicate its «domestica-
tion»19 in any way: on the contrary, 
it means to let it free to give its 
contribution. 
In sum, pmCTT insists on the 
fact that a good life can be lived 
only within good institutions, in 
almost three ways. 
i) It deals with the social 
unconscious of a given society, that 
is, with the reciprocal relationship 
between individuals and society, 
reconstructing its web and knots. If 
it could be true that there is no such 
thing as society, it’s also true that 
the society as process does exist, act 
and be acted: in critiquing it, we 
cannot refer to an external ideal or 
alter social reference in order to give 
a metaphysical authorization or a 
moral imperative, but we can still 
examine it as a peculiar instance of 
problem posing-solving. 
ii) On the individual side, this 
implies that critique doesn’t prescribe 
behaviors or recommend manners to 
individuals. Rather, it raises questi-
ons as: are we able to appropriate of 
ourselves and our own life? Can we 
really put our individual mark on, 
and insert our own ends and 
qualities into what we live? Do we 
have ourselves at our command? To 
what extent can we affect our 
society? Can we also impose our 
meaningful mark on it? Do we have 
the possibility to put it in question? 
Are we first of all able to perceive 
such a need? Etc. 
iii) On the social side, this 
implies that critique doesn’t provide 
to society and its institutions its own 
telos, the opportunity for a recon-
ciliation between norm and fact. 
Rather, it poses problems as: can 
they enable individuals to appro-
priate themselves and their own life? 
To what extent are they going by 
themselves, that is, is their functio-
ning becoming autonomous, no 
matter if and how individuals accept 
it, feel good in it, participate in it, 
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etc.? Are they once for all solidified 
and ossified, unquestionable, and 
thus unexpressive (even before that 
repressive)? Etc. 
 
Conclusion. Unity Makes 
Strength 
 
The distinction around which I 
developed my ideas is not to say that 
all we need is pmCTT. Actually, this 
would contradict one of the ideas 
which shape such an approach, 
namely, taking seriously human 
being’s plurality – in the widest 
meaning. 
In society, under this regard, it 
happens the same as in individuals’ 
life: depending on the phase of the 
process that one is living, different 
resources need to be activated and 
mobilized. In other words, some-
times an energetic “no!” may be the 
best strategy, some others a laboring 
work of immersive problematization 
may be more opportune: what 
counts is to avoid in the critical 
undertaking that kind of unilaterality 
which appears so reductive and 
choking in individual and social life. 
You cannot be critical if you are not 
at the same time self- and meta-
critical
 
Note 
 
1 See more in detail A. Elliott, 
Contemporary Social Theory: An 
Introduction, Routledge, London 
and New York, 2014. 
2 This may be also brought back to the 
paradigms of German Philosophy 
and French Theory, about which see 
R. Esposito, Da fuori. Una filosofia 
per l’Europa, Einaudi, Torino, 2016, 
pp. 64-145. 
3 As formulated by Z. Bauman, 
Legislators and Interpreters: On 
Modernity, Post-Modernity and 
Intellectuals, Cornell University 
Press, Ithaca, 1987. 
4 B. Spinoza, Political Treatise 
(1677), in Id., Complete Works, M. 
L. Morgan (ed.), trans. S. Shirley, 
Hackett, Indianapolis, 2002, pp. 
676-754: 681. 
5 Particularly: G. Deleuze, The Logic 
of Sense (1969), trans. M. Lester, 
Athlone Press, London, 1990; Id., 
Difference and Repetition (1968), 
trans. P. Patton, Columbia 
University Press, New York, 1994; 
Id., The Fold–Leibniz and the 
Baroque (1989), trans. T. Conley, 
Continuum, London, 2006; J. 
Derrida, Of Grammatology (1967), 
trans. G.C. Spivak, Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1976; 
Id., Margins of Philosophy (1972), 
trans. A. Bass, Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, Hemel Hempstead, 
1982; J.-F. Lyotard, Rudiments 
païens. Genre dissertatif, Christian 
Bourgois, Paris, 1977; Id., 
Postmodern Fables (1993), trans. G. 
Van Den Abbeele, University of 
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1997. 
6 Namely: R. Jaeggi, Der Standpunkt 
der KritischenTheorie. 
Überlegungen zum 
Objektivitätsanspruch Kritischer 
Theorie, in «Sonderheft», n. 50, 
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2010, pp. 478-493; Id., Alienation 
(2005), trans. F. Neuhouser and A.E. 
Smith, Columbia University Press, 
New York, 2014; Id., Kritik von 
Lebensformen, Suhrkamp, Berlin, 
2014; T. Stahl, Immanente Kritik. 
Elemente einer Theorie sozialer 
Praktiken, Campus, Frankfurt a.M., 
2013. 
7 Mostly L.Althusser, For Marx 
(1965), tr. by B. Brewster, Verso, 
London 1996. 
8 Or – one could stress – it was 
already the original and explicit 
destination of the CTT’s project: 
see, as emblematic example, M. 
Horkheimer, The Social Function of 
Philosophy, in «Studies in 
Philosophy and Social Science», n. 
8, 1939. 
9 T. Stahl (Immanente Kritik. 
Elemente einer Theorie sozialer 
Praktiken, cit.), claims that 
immanent critique is already at the 
core of what here I call mCTT, 
which originally intended to avoid 
the traps of both external and 
internal critique. 
10 For further discussion and 
references, see: G. Pezzano, Debitori 
(e creditori) a vita. Per una 
morfologia del debito (e del credito), 
in «Lessico di Etica pubblica», IV, 
n. 1, 2013, pp. 1-20; Id., Marxismo e 
natura umana, in A. Monchietto 
(ed.), Invito allo straniamento. II. 
Costanzo Preve marxiano, Petite 
Plaisance, Pistoia, 2016, pp. 115-
129. 
11 About this, see the important S. 
Skempton, Alienation After Derrida, 
Continuum, London-New York, 
2010. 
12 I take into account the distinction, 
more strictly concerning the 
physis/techne affair, made by L. 
Floridi, Harmonising Physis and 
Techne: the Mediating Role of 
Philosophy, in «Philosophy & 
Technology», XXIV, n. 1, 2011, pp. 
1-3, but see also G. Pezzano,Oltre la 
tecno-fobia/mania: prospettive di 
“tecno-realismo” a partire dall’ 
antropologia filosofica, in «Etica & 
Politica», XIV, n. 1, 2012, pp. 125-
173. 
13 See the recent A. Honneth, Die Idee 
des Sozialismus, Suhrkamp, Berlin, 
2015. 
14 C. Colebrook, Irony, Routledge, 
London and New York 2004, p. 148. 
15 M. Gutauskas, Truth, in G. 
Chiurazzi, D. Sisto and S. Tinning 
(eds.), Philosophical Paths in the 
Public Sphere, LIT, Zürich and 
Berlin, 2014, pp. 239-249: 243. 
16 See more broadly the relevant P. 
Sloterdijk, Critique of Cynical 
Reason (1983), trans. M. Eldred, 
University of Minnesota Press, 
Minneapolis, 1988. 
17 See for instance R. Sorensen, A Brief 
History of the Paradox: Philosophy 
and the Labyrinths of the Mind, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003. 
18 On the connection between paradox, 
transformation, and humor see also 
the relevant P. Watzlawick, J. H. 
Weakland and R. Fisch, Change: 
Principles of Problem Formation 
and Problem Solution, W.W. Norton 
& Company, New York, 1974. 
19 See: M.J. Thompson, T he 
Domestication of Critical Theory, 
Rowman & Littlefield, London, 
2016. 
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